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A Brief Feedback Intervention for Diagnostic Overshadowing
David S. Wood and Terence J. G. Tracey
Arizona State University
Clinical decision-making errors are well-documented among both experienced clinicians and students.
One robust clinical decision-making error is called diagnostic overshadowing (DO), which occurs when
the presence of one diagnosis interferes with the detection of other diagnoses. This study tested whether
two types of instruction and brief feedback interventions reduced the likelihood of DO. Specifically,
content-based feedback and principle-based feedback significantly reduced the likelihood of DO among
doctoral students in clinical and counseling psychology (N ⫽ 220). An intervention effect was found
when the training task and the target task were highly similar. Recommendations for improving
diagnostic decision-making among trainees in professional psychology are discussed.
Keywords: clinical decision-making, psychodiagnosis, diagnostic overshadowing, feedback, training in
professional psychology

clinical error, that of overshadowing, which occurs when multiple
disorders are present, but the salient features of one condition
preclude or overshadow consideration of others. We focus on
overshadowing and evaluate the efficacy of two brief feedback
interventions in their ability to reduce overshadowing.
Diagnostic overshadowing—a term first coined by Reiss, Levitan and Szysko (1982) has been well established in analogue
studies examining mental retardation (MR; Alford & Locke, 1984;
Levitan & Reiss, 1983; Reiss et al., 1982; Reiss & Szysko, 1983;
Spengler, Strohmer, & Prout, 1990). This literature shows that
diagnostic overshadowing is a robust phenomenon among clinicians who, when presented with case studies involving MR, tend to
overlook mood disturbance (Reiss et al., 1982), agoraphobia (Levitan & Reiss, 1983; Reiss et al., 1982), thought disorders (Garner,
Strohmer, Langford, & Boas, 1994; Reiss et al., 1982; Reiss &
Szyszko, 1983; Spengler & Strohmer, 1994; Spengler et al., 1990),
avoidant personality disorder (Reiss et al., 1982), and overall
severity of psychopathology (Alford & Locke, 1984). White et al.,
(1995) conducted a meta-analysis of the MR overshadowing effect
and found a small to moderate effect size of .19. The existence of
diagnostic overshadowing for MR has been reported in clinical
case studies as well (Hurley & Sovner, 1995; Tranebjaerg &
Orum, 1991).
Diagnostic overshadowing has been examined in areas outside
MR using analogue and field research methods. Analogue research
designs have shown that traumatic brain injury and epilepsy overshadow psychiatric disorders (Garner et al., 1994), and that learning disabilities and hearing impairment overshadow behavior disorders (Goldsmith & Schloss, 1984). Field studies have shown a
diagnostic overshadowing effect of mood and thought disorders on
substance use disorders in psychiatric settings (Ananth, Vandewater, Kamal, & Brodsky, 1989; Goethe & Ahmadi, 1991; Skodol,
Williams, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Kass, 1984). Conversely, several
field studies conducted in substance use treatment settings have
shown an overshadowing effect of substance use disorders on
anxiety disorders (Fals-Stewart & Angarano, 1994; Kranzler et al.,
1995; Riemann & McNally, 1992).

Two daunting issues face mental health practitioners when they
make clinical-decisions: 1) Clinical decision-making is an error
prone process (Faust, 1986; Garb, 1998), and 2) Clinicians rarely
get feedback on the accuracy and validity of their decisions so they
have few opportunities to improve (Garb & Schramke, 1996). The
prevalence of human information processing errors has been emphasized in the now classic work by Kahneman and Tversky
(1974), who described several types of heuristics, or simplified and
implicit judgment rules that are “quite useful but can lead to severe
and systematic errors” (p. 1124). Focus on judgment bias and
decision-making errors among mental health practitioners has also
garnered attention. Many types of errors have been identified
among mental health clinicians (Tracey & Rounds, 1999). Extensive reviews on clinical decision making, such as Garb (1998) and
Faust (1986) have identified client characteristics related to biased
decision making (race, social class, gender, sex role and age), as
well as information processing errors (illusory correlations, context effects, labeling effects, overperception of psychopathology,
overconfidence and diagnostic overshadowing). These reviews
join with what has become a persistent critique of clinical decision
making and the need to improve (e.g., Dawes, 1994; Lopez, 1989;
Meehl, 1960). The focus of this study is on a specific type of
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Several methods for reducing diagnostic overshadowing have
been proposed. Generally speaking, Garb and Schramke (1996)
have suggested that one reason why clinicians may make judgment
errors is due to a lack of feedback. Feedback is assumed to have a
powerful remedial effect on decision-making errors because it
allows the clinician to learn from experience, as well as understand
the impact of the clinician’s decisions and actions (Lambert, Hansen, & Finch, 2001). We focused on the benefit of providing
feedback in reducing errors. However, there are two separate
pedagogical methods for providing feedback: content based and
principle based.
Texts that focus on instruction of diagnostic skills (e.g.,Fauman,
2002; First, Frances, & Pincus, 2002; Morrison, 2000) focus on
symptoms, etiological rule-outs, and competing diagnosis ruleouts. Individuals are instructed on where they have made errors
and then correct content is typically provided (e.g., exact criteria
that apply to the diagnosis are provided). Generally, there is little
focus on potential information processing errors in these texts.
This more traditional approach to diagnosis was also represented
in this study as content-based feedback. This type of feedback
focused only on the specific symptoms that may have been overlooked by clinicians.
An alternative model that focuses more on learning to minimize
information-processing errors was also examined. This feedback
condition was labeled principle-based feedback because the
information-processing error that was specifically used was of
focus instead of the specific content of the diagnostic error. For
example, a content-based feedback would focus on what diagnosis
was overlooked in an overshadowing case and then highlight the
criteria of this omitted diagnosis. A principle-based feedback
would focus on the informing the participant of the overshadowing
error itself and explain how this type of error is frequently committed. The principle-based feedback focuses on teaching the
metacognition concept (Driscoll, 2000) rather than more casespecific content. We hypothesized that the principle-based feedback would result in less overshadowing especially in cases involving different diagnoses. There should be more generalization
of learning in the principle-based feedback condition over a
content-based condition given the broader focus on metacognition.
In addition, both the content-based and principle-based feedback
conditions should yield less overshadowing than a no-feedback
control group.
So the focus was on evaluating a brief feedback intervention
aimed at decreasing overshadowing in diagnosis. The brief intervention thus involved two separate feedback models: content- and
principle-based. We hypothesized that both would result in less
overshadowing relative to no-feedback control and further, that the
principle-based feedback condition would demonstrate greater
generalization of learning to other diagnostic types than would the
content-based feedback condition.

Method
Sample
Graduate students in doctoral programs in clinical and counseling psychology were recruited as participants in this Internet-based
study. A total of 220 participants completed the study. The mean
age of the participants in the study was 29.49 (SD ⫽ 5.59).
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Seventy-five percent of the sample was female. Regarding ethnicity, 76% of the sample was White, 6% Asian American, 5%
multiethnic, 4% Hispanic, 4% African American, 2% international
student, 1% Native American, and 0.5% other. Sixty-nine percent
of participants held a masters degree, whereas 23% held only a
bachelor’s degree and 7% held a doctorate degree at the time of
their participation. The majority of all respondents were currently
enrolled as doctoral students (86%). Six percent indicated that they
were enrolled in a masters program, 5% said they were in a
postdoctoral program, and 2% indicated they were licensed professionals. Eighty-six percent of all participants said their clinical
specialty was psychology, 9% indicated mental health counseling,
2% selected social work, 2% indicated marital and family therapy,
and 1% said other. Given that only students in American Psychiatric Association (APA)-accredited programs were solicited to be
in this study, the presence of these individuals with nonpsychology
backgrounds was surprising and we interpreted this as reflecting
the small number of individuals who indicated a nonpsychology
specialty training prior to or in addition to their enrollment in an
APA-approved program.

Stimulus Materials
All study materials were presented via the Internet. Participants
signed on and were given a brief demographic questionnaire. They
were then randomly assigned, based on their institutional program,
to one of three conditions: principle-based feedback, content-based
feedback, and no feedback control. The participants were then
presented with two training vignettes, after each of which the
feedback conditions were implemented. Following the two training
vignettes, three outcome vignettes were presented. All vignettes
were presented to all participants, with only the three feedback
conditions (principle-based, content-based, or no-feedback) varying after the two training vignettes.
Participants were asked to read each vignette and make diagnostic decisions based on the information presented. The decisionmaking task was similar to that found in other diagnostic decision
making studies, namely, participants made probability ratings of a
list of diagnoses. For both the training and outcome vignettes in all
conditions, participants made ratings of five diagnostic options
according to the probability that the diagnosis was present in the
case history (1 ⫽ not present; 4 ⫽ possibly present; 7 ⫽ definitely
present).

Training Vignettes
Training vignette 1 (“Susan”) was identical to that used in
previous diagnostic overshadowing studies (Reiss et al., 1982)
except the name and gender of the patient was changed to a female.
Dr. Reiss was contacted and permission was granted to use the
vignette for the study (Reiss, personal communication July 23,
2003). MR was the conspicuous diagnosis, whereas schizophrenia
was the overshadowed diagnosis.
Training vignette 2 (“Ed”) was contrived based on clinical
reports described by Hurley and Sovner (1995), who indicated that
the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is often overshadowed by MR. The fictional client had a history that clearly met the
criteria for MR, which was the intended conspicuous diagnosis. He
also displayed sufficient antisocial behavior, cognition and affect
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to meet criteria for antisocial personality disorder, which was the
intended overshadowed diagnosis.

Feedback Conditions
The intention of the principle-based feedback condition was to
teach participants about a common information processing error
(diagnostic overshadowing), as well as prompt a metacognitive
strategy for the task (i.e., monitoring their own decision-making
processes and cognitive strategies). Consequently, feedback was
given in terms of whether or not the person made a diagnostic
decision-making error, followed by a definition of diagnostic overshadowing. The statement for the first training vignette in the
principle-based condition was:
The details in this vignette meet criteria for both MR and
schizophrenia. If you rated schizophrenia as a 4 or less, you made
a decision-making error called diagnostic overshadowing. Diagnostic overshadowing occurs when features of one diagnosis stand
out more than features of another diagnosis (i.e., one overshadows
the other).
For the content-based condition, the feedback made no mention
of the term diagnostic overshadowing, but instead, listed the DSM–
IV–TR (APA, 2000) criteria that were present in the vignette that
also fulfill criteria for the overshadowed diagnosis. This can be
construed as a “classic” approach to training in diagnostic decision
making. The content-based feedback statement for the first training vignette was:
The details in this vignette meet criteria for both mental retardation and schizophrenia. If you rated schizophrenia as a 4 or less,
you made a decision-making error. The details in this vignette
meet the following DSM–IV–TR criteria for schizophrenia: A.1,
A.3, A.4, and A.5.
Both the principle-based condition and the content-based condition were relatively balanced with respect to length. The contentbased feedback condition would have been potentially much
lengthier had each criterion been described in the text. Instead, the
criterion number as it appears in DSM–IV–TR was provided. With
this modification, the principle-based and content-based feedback
statements were 51 and 45 words, respectively.
Lastly, the control condition included only information that the
participant had made an error or not. In this condition, there was no
elaboration as to why there was an error made. The feedback
statement for the control condition is included below:
The details in this vignette meet criteria for both mental retardation and sSchizophrenia. If you rated schizophrenia as a 4 or
less, you made a decision-making error.
For all conditions, a reference to a research study was provided
that supported the feedback statement for the vignette. Participants
were able to view an “answer key” to the most appropriate diagnostic ratings for each of the five options. This visual form of
feedback highlighted the diagnoses that were not correct, as well as
the two (the conspicuous and overshadowed) diagnoses that were
correct. In addition to the text feedback and answer key, participants were able to click on a hyperlink and review the diagnostic
ratings that they made for each training vignette.
It was anticipated that some participants would be more effective diagnosticians than others. To control for a ceiling effect,
feedback was given for all options for each training case history,
regardless of the correctness of the participant’s response. This

was intended to make the training effect more likely even for those
individuals for whom diagnostic overshadowing was less of a
concern. Additionally, the difficulty level of the training case
histories was intentionally high, so that most individuals would
have opportunity to see where they may have made overshadowing
errors. Given the frequency of overshadowing among the numerous analogue and field studies, it was anticipated that most participants would make some errors.

Outcome Vignettes
The three outcome vignettes were written with (a) a conspicuous
or overshadowing diagnosis, and (b) a less evident series of symptoms that meet criteria for the overshadowed diagnosis. Both the
primary and the overshadowed diagnosis were listed as one of five
options for which participants were asked to make probability
ratings. The other three options were distractor items for which
some, but not enough diagnostic criteria were met. The writing of
the clinical vignettes entailed establishing the intended and nonintended diagnoses through carefully attending to DSM–IV–TR
criteria and generating a written narrative that differentially included criteria for the diagnoses. After each diagnosis and its
intended criteria were established, clinical vignettes from various
books on diagnostic instruction (e.g., Fauman, 2002; Morrison,
2000) were used as examples to craft plausible details and the flow
of clinical information for each vignette. Specifically, three different outcome vignettes were created: one to test overshadowing of
the same content, (i.e., MR overshadowing another diagnosis), one
to test generalization of learning to another example of diagnostic
overshadowing besides MR, (i.e., specifically schizoid personality
disorder), and a nonovershadowing conditions of a pure diagnosis.
These three outcome vignettes were presented in the common
order of: the generalization condition, (“Stephen,” schizoid personality disorder overshadowed by major depression, with the
following as distractor diagnoses: delusional disorder, schizotypal
personality disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder), the similar
diagnostic overshadowing condition, (“Jason,” major depressive
disorder overshadowed by MR with the following as distractor
diagnoses: social phobia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
schizophrenia), and the pure diagnostic condition, (“Felicia,” alcohol abuse only with the following as distractor diagnoses: alcohol dependence, major depression, borderline personality disorder,
and paranoid personality disorder). Following each vignette, respondents were requested to endorse the probability of diagnosis
of five diagnoses using the seven point response format (1 ⫽ not
present; 4 ⫽ possibly present; 7 ⫽ definitely present). Following
the rating of the presence of all diagnoses, participants were asked
to rate their confidence in the diagnostic ratings using a seven
point scale (1 ⫽ no confidence, “I guessed”; 4 ⫽ somewhat
confident; 7 ⫽ strong confidence - “I am confident my ratings are
highly accurate”).

Validity Ratings
The three outcome vignettes were validated by a team of raters
that included five advanced graduate students in counseling psychology and one tenured professor in counseling psychology. The
graduate students were familiar with the DSM-VI-TR (APA, 2000)
diagnostic criteria through graduate level course work and super-
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vised practicum experience. The rating team was presented with
the outcome vignettes as they appeared in the study. Raters were
asked to determine whether or not each criterion was represented
in the vignette. Rather than assign diagnoses, each rater had a list
that included each behavioral diagnostic criterion as listed in the
DSM for all five diagnoses that were listed as options for the
outcome vignettes. These ratings were then taken and coded as to
whether each rater’s selections endorsed or failed to endorse
minimum criteria for the diagnosis. The resulting ratings were
compared with the rating criterion, which in this case was each
intended diagnoses and each distractor diagnosis. As an example,
for the “Stephen” vignette, the rating team was presented with the
vignette as it appeared in the study. After reading through
the vignette, the raters reviewed a list all the symptoms listed in the
DSM associated with each of the five diagnostic options being
assessed for this client and indicated whether or not the symptom
was present in the vignette with a “yes” or “no.” The list of
symptoms was taken directly for each of the five diagnoses that
would eventually be presented to the participants in the study. In
this case, the symptoms were the diagnostic criteria for the following diagnoses: major depression, delusional disorder, schizoid
personality disorder, schizotypal personality disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. The actual diagnostic labels (e.g., major
depression) were not provided to the rating team. These ratings
were scored as to whether the responses resulted in a diagnosis or
not for each set of symptoms on the rating form. For instance, if a
rater indicated “yes” on five or more of the symptoms on the list
that corresponded to major depression, the ratings were scored to
indicate that the diagnosis was present. This was done for each of
the criteria sets. Kappa statistics were computed for each rater with
the criterion diagnoses. The mean kappa coefficient for each rater
and the criterion ratings were then used as the final measure of
representativeness of the diagnostic options for the vignette.
The “Stephen” vignette (schizoid personality disorder overshadowed by major depression) obtained an average pairwise kappa
coefficient of .80 over the six raters, with a range of .55 – 1.00 and
a SD of .23, which indicates a high level of agreement with the
criterion diagnoses. The “Jason” vignette (major depressive disorder overshadowed by mental retardation) resulted in an average
pairwise kappa coefficient of 1.0, which indicates perfect agreement with the criterion diagnoses. The “Felicia” vignette (alcohol
abuse only) had an average pairwise kappa coefficient for each of
the five diagnostic options of .70, with a range of .55 – 1.0 and a
SD of .26, which indicates good agreement with the criterion
diagnoses.
This approach of rating diagnostic criteria and not making
diagnostic decisions is methodologically important because this
reduces the probability of making inferential errors about diagnosis. Furthermore, Garb (1998) has argued that methods for validation of criterion cases in clinical-decision making studies should be
methodologically distinct from the tasks required of participants.
Otherwise, the results are merely reliability ratings between raters
and research participants. Checklist-like structured clinical interviews have been demonstrated to be a method to avoid many types
of clinical decision-making errors (Garb, 1998). Our usage of this
behavioral checklist validation strategy provides more accurate
information than having global ratings of diagnosis.
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Procedures
Both clinical and counseling APA-accredited programs were
solicited to participate in this study via electronic methods. Fortyone clinical psychology programs were randomly selected from a
stratified, rank ordered list of 183 programs based on their cumulative scores on the Examination for the Professional Practice of
Psychology (EPPP; Plous, S., n.d.). In order to assure an equal
distribution of clinical programs from across all levels, this rankordered list was divided into quartiles, and random assignments
were made to one of the three feedback conditions within each
quartile. All known counseling psychology programs (N ⫽ 83)
were requested to participate, and 17 either refused participation or
could not be contacted electronically. The remaining 66 counseling
psychology programs were randomly assigned to one of the three
feedback conditions. While email verification was not required or
requested from academic programs during this solicitation process,
several programs responded and indicated that they would forward
the solicitation to student listservs in their respective programs.
Specifically, 19 counseling psychology programs and 10 clinical
programs verified that they would send the solicitations out via an
email message.
Each program was randomly assigned to a different feedback
condition. The principle-based condition had 79 participants, the
content-based condition had 96 participants and the control condition had 45 participants. Two-way contingency table analyses
were conducted to determine if there was differential distribution
of participants across feedback conditions. No significant relationships were found across feedback condition for gender, 2(2, N ⫽
220) ⫽ 2.68, p ⫽ .26, Cramer’s V ⫽ .11; ethnicity (majority vs.
minority), 2(2, N ⫽ 220) ⫽ 1.60, p ⫽ .45, Cramer’s V ⫽ .09; and
degree earned (only BA vs. graduate), 2(2, N ⫽ 220) ⫽ 2.18, p ⫽
.34, Cramer’s V ⫽ .10.
Because participants were nested according to their clinical
training program, there was a possibility of nonrandom distribution
among the various categories. A test of the homogeneity of variance assumption was conducted to test whether or not this assumption was violated. The Levene statistic was used to test the null
hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is
equal across groups. Type of feedback was the independent variable and included three levels: principle-based, content-based, and
control. The dependent variable was the mean overshadowed diagnosis rating. The Levene test was not significant, F(2, 217) ⫽
2.76, p ⫽ .07. Strictly interpreted, this test suggests that the
population variances from which the samples were drawn were not
significantly different and provides modest support that this assumption was not grossly violated in the inferential tests reported
in this study.

Results
The means and standards deviations of the diagnostic ratings for
each of the outcome vignettes are presented in Table 1. One of the
analyses of interest involved the differences between the salient
and the overshadowed diagnostic ratings. The scores for the salient
diagnosis and the overshadowed diagnostic ratings were examined
using a mixed-factor, repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the five specific diagnostic ratings serving as the
within subject variable (Salient diagnosis rating for Stephen, over-
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Table 1
Participant Ratings of Dependent Variables According to Feedback Condition
Feedback condition

Vignette/dependent variable
N
MR/Axis-I (“Jason”)
Salient Diagnosis (MR)
Overshadowed Diag. (Depression)
Distractor Diagnoses
Confidence Level
Axis-I/Axis-II (“Stephen”)
Salient Diagnosis (Depression)s
Overshadowed Diag. (Schizoid)
Distractor Diagnoses
Confidence Level
Diagnostically Simple (“Felicia”)
Salient Diagnosis (Alcohol Abuse)
Distractor Diagnoses
Confidence Level
Note.

Principle

Based

Content

Based

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

79

96

SD

Different groups

CB ⬎ PB, CO
CB, PB ⬎ CO

45

6.10
4.16
2.84
5.03

0.90
1.63
0.86
0.96

6.35
4.24
2.84
4.85

0.73
1.34
0.92
0.94

6.13
3.80
2.62
4.73

0.92
1.55
0.84
0.89

6.33
3.96
2.26
5.10

0.63
1.78
0.79
0.96

6.40
4.22
2.33
5.00

0.70
1.47
0.83
0.93

6.56
3.69
2.26
4.96

0.59
1.88
0.98
1.11

5.86
3.14
5.32

1.37
0.63
0.84

6.32
3.10
5.30

0.88
0.61
0.85

6.09
3.18
5.29

1.43
0.69
0.97

CB ⬎ PB, CO

CB ⬎ PB, CO

All values are based on 1–7 rating scales. CB ⫽ Content-based Feedback; PB ⫽ Principle-based Feedback; CO ⫽ Control, no feedback.

shadowed diagnosis rating for Stephen, salient diagnosis rating for
Jason, overshadowed diagnosis rating for Jason, and salient diagnostic rating for Felicia) and feedback condition (principle-based
feedback, content-based feedback, and no-feedback control) serving as the between subject variable. The results of the ANOVA
were significant for the within-subjects effect of differences across
the five diagnostic ratings (F(4, 214) ⫽ 192.03, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽
.78) indicating there were differences in the levels of diagnosis
given across the ratings, which was hypothesized at least with
respect to the overshadowed diagnoses. The post hoc tests indicated that the highest probability was found for the salient diagnosis of major depression for Stephen, which was significantly
greater than the salient diagnoses of MR for Jason and alcohol
abuse for Felicia, which in turn was significantly greater than the
two overshadowed diagnoses, major depression for both Jason and
schizoid personality disorder for Stephen. So across feedback
condition, the participants saw the overshadowed diagnoses as
significantly less probable. These results support the presence of
overshadowing and add to the numerous studies already in the
literature that document diagnostic overshadowing errors.
The between subjects feedback condition effect was also significant, F(2, 217) ⫽ 3.92, p ⬍ .05, 2 ⫽ .04. Deviation contrasts
were used to examine this effect because they are more interpretable given these data than the default polynomial constrasts because we specified contrasts between groups of interest that fit our
questions, rather than using the default weighted composites of the
groups. The deviation contrasts revealed that across all five diagnostic ratings, the content-based feedback group had the highest
probability ratings and these were significantly greater than those
of the other two groups. So across all salient variables, the contentbased group was more likely to endorse the correct responses.
The primary question of the study involved the interaction
between the feedback condition and diagnostic ratings. This interaction effect was significant, F(8, 430) ⫽ 2.01, p ⬍ .05, 2 ⫽ .04.
Post hoc Tukey’s tests were conducted to determine the differences among the feedback groups for each of the five diagnostic

ratings. These post hoc tests are summarized in the right column of
Table 1.
For the ratings of Jason, the vignette that was most similar to the
training vignettes in that it involved MR as the salient diagnosis,
the ratings of MR were significantly higher in the content-based
feedback group than in either of the other two groups. This result
makes sense as the specific content involved in the MR diagnoses
was the feedback provided in this feedback condition. The overshadowed diagnosis of major depression was rated as significantly
more probable in both feedback conditions than in the no-feedback
control condition. The feedback of either type was related to less
overshadowing.
The Stephen vignette was included as an examination of the
generalization, as it involved a different salient diagnosis (depression). There were no significant differences on the salient diagnosis of major depression across feedback conditions. The overshadowed diagnosis of schizoid personality disorder was rated
significantly higher in the content-based feedback condition than
in the other two conditions. Content-based feedback was related to
less overshadowing.
The final vignette was a “clean” description involving no overshadowing. The content-based feedback condition resulted in significantly higher probability ratings for the salient diagnosis than
either of the other feedback conditions.
We conducted a similar repeated-measures ANOVA on the
confidence ratings obtained for each of the three vignettes. There
was a significant repeated-measures main effect for specific vignette (F(2, 216) ⫽ 23.74, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .18). Post hoc tests
indicated that the participants were significantly more confident of
their ratings for the Stephen (major depression/schizoid personality disorder) than they were of their ratings of the Jason vignette
(MR/major depression), and both of these ratings were significantly lower than the confidence ratings for the Felicia (alcohol
abuse) vignette. There were no significant between subjects effects
for feedback condition, F(2, 217) ⫽ 0.67, p ⬎ .05, 2 ⫽ .01. So
feedback condition was not related to confidence differences.
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There was also no significant feedback by vignette interaction,
F(4, 434) ⫽ 0.72, p ⬎ .05, 2 ⫽ .01, indicating that the confidence
ratings did not vary across the feedback conditions differentially
by vignette.
There was a possibility that the different feedback conditions
had the undesirable effect of alerting respondents to make diagnoses that were not present in each case. The design of this study
included distractor diagnoses, which involved diagnoses representing some of the diagnostic criteria, but not sufficient to meet
minimum criteria. For each of the vignettes, the distractor diagnosis ratings were tested across the different conditions. In each
instance, none was significantly different from each other, indicating
that the feedback did not have this undersirable effect: Jason, F(2,
217) ⫽ 0.16, p ⬎ .05, 2 ⫽ .01; Stephen, F(2, 217) ⫽ 1.10, p ⬎ .34,
2 ⫽ .01; Felica, F(2, 217) ⫽ 0.26, p ⬎ .05, 2 ⫽ .01.

Discussion
Consistent with results from the body of literature on this topic,
diagnostic overshadowing was apparent in this study (e.g., Reiss et
al., 1982; Spengler et al., 1990). The brief feedback intervention
presented here, however, showed a significant effect, suggesting
that the tendency to make the diagnostic overshadowing error can
be minimized through training and feedback. Specifically, diagnostic overshadowing is reduced by either principle-based feedback or content-based feedback, but only when the training task is
highly similar to the target task. This study found no appreciable
differences between the content-based and principle-based models
of decision making, but these two conditions resulted in significantly less overshadowing than the control group. Also, this study
found that a generalization effect with the content-based feedback
occurred. Another important implication of this study is that a brief
feedback intervention for diagnostic overshadowing can be delivered in an electronic format, which can either stand alone or
supplement other types of training.
Metacognition was used as a conceptual framework to explain
why principle-based feedback should be superior to that of
content-based feedback. It was hypothesized that metacognition,
or the ability to self-monitor and select appropriate strategies, is
the primary skill that clinicians must improve if they are to reduce
the likelihood of making diagnostic decision-making errors. With
respect to diagnostic overshadowing, however, this prediction was
not borne out. In contrast, the content-based condition seemed to
draw upon another important conceptual framework for diagnostic
overshadowing: cognitive complexity. Cognitive complexity, or
the ability to simultaneously process multiple constructs and their
interrelationships (Bieri et al., 1966), has been demonstrated as a
distinguishing variable for those who do and do not show proneness to make overshadowing errors (Spengler & Strohmer, 1994).
The content-based feedback condition may have primed participants to attend to the diagnostic criteria more carefully, which is a
rudimentary but often overlooked remedy for diagnostic errors
(Garb, 1996). Diagnostic overshadowing was conspicuously absent among the rating teams who developed the master ratings for
the posttest vignettes, suggesting that a criterion by criterion review of a wide range of possible diagnoses may also reduce
diagnostic overshadowing. Lastly, the content-based feedback ap-

223

proach also showed a generalization effect, indicating that if training is focused on highly specific diagnostic criteria, individuals
tend to be less likely to make the diagnostic overshadowing error
when working with diagnoses other than those used in training.
Furthermore, the content-based feedback approach may be more
suited to trainees who are becoming familiar with DSM diagnostic
criteria. The utility of principle-based feedback might not be fully
realized until a diagnostician obtains substantial experience with
the DSM.
Construct validity must be addressed in interpreting these results. Both the brevity and the format of the intervention may have
contributed to the results of this study. Although brevity was
prioritized in order to maximize participation and minimize fatigue, it is likely that increasing the length of the intervention
might more adequately provide participants the opportunity to
thoroughly learn and implement corrective strategies to avert diagnostic overshadowing. With respect to external validity, some
research has shown that the probability for errors is equal in both
graduate students and practicing professionals regardless of experience (Garb, 1989). Additionally, a sample size of 220 participants is not small on the face of it, but when considered in the
context of all clinical and counseling trainees in over 260 programs, it is probably less then 5% of all possible participants.
One limitation of this study is the lack of true random assignment. Although all programs were randomly assigned to one of the
three feedback conditions, participants that belong to the same
program were assigned to (and nested in) the same condition. The
assignment of programs to condition, instead of assigning individuals, was done to avoid the possibility of intersubject communication. Similarly, the name of each individual’s training institution
was not requested due to the possibility of being identified from
among the sometimes small number of clinically trained students
at some programs. One significant limitation of this study that
complicates causal inferences is the omission of each participant’s
program of study because relative differences in the quality of
clinical training, if any, were not controlled. On balance, programs
were rank ordered into quartiles and randomly assigned to conditions according to their cumulative averages on the EPPP. The
EPPP was regarded in this study as a measure of general knowledge in psychology (the EPPP is a broad exam that has a subsection on psychodiagnostic knowledge). Because the relative differences in EPPP scores among the various programs were accounted
for prior to random assignment, a modest albeit imperfect effort
was made to protect against nonrandom distribution of participants
to the various conditions. Future research is needed to see if similar
results hold and, more particularly, to test for similar effects while
controlling for nesting of participants within academic programs.
Additionally, this study examined only the short-term effects of
training and feedback. Future research should examine if training
effects hold over time.
Noteworthy criticisms of online research have been made (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). Among the many concerns
noted is the validity of participants and participant responses. In
other words, there are possible limitations due to not ensuring that
respondents are actually who they say they are. Because of the
confidentiality required by this study, as well as the extensive time
requirement involved in validating participant identity, the study
relied on sending solicitations directly to directors of training.
Although this is not a complete guarantee, it offered some degree
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of assurance that the solicitations were only received by actual
graduate students in clinical fields.
The results of this study have specific implications for training
in professional psychology, particularly in the area of mental
health diagnosis. Training in psychodiagnostic skills should include 1) the disciplined practice of evaluating a wide range of
diagnostic criteria each time a diagnosis is being considered, and
2) vigilance and critical self-evaluation for high likelihood decision making errors, including diagnostic overshadowing. In short,
trainees will benefit from specific feedback and training on the
possible pitfalls of heuristics. Specific feedback is likely best
delivered during the actual diagnostic task. It may not be sufficient
to merely read about decision-making errors. Based on our results,
trainers can take a measurable degree of confidence that utilization
of specific feedback in training can reduce the possibility of
diagnostic overshadowing errors.
Clinical decision-making research plays a critical role in psychological assessment literature. It may be easy to conclude that
information processing errors are inevitable and perhaps overly
intractable, but the current study and hopefully those to come will
contribute to a library of feedback interventions that successfully
improve clinical decision making and enable clinicians to improve,
monitor, and provide more suitable mental health diagnosis and
treatment.
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